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**Joint Task Force - Information Operations (JTF-IO):
Should One Exist?**

By

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**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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Abstract

Joint Task Force-Information Operations (JTF-IO): Should One Exist? By Commander Patrick J. Bohan, USN. 18 pages.

Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations was published in 1998 to provide guidance on conducting joint information operations (IO). Currently under revision, the draft version does not correct the deficiencies noted during recent conflicts, primarily the inadequacy of joint doctrine with respect to IO organization. A Joint Task Force (JTF) commander has an IO cell, responsible for operational level IO planning and the oversight of IO execution across the task force. Time is required to realize the full effects of an IO campaign, and delaying detailed planning or focused execution of the elements of IO until activation of a JTF does not provide sufficient time for IO to be effective.

Based on analysis of recent conflicts with respect to IO, creation of a Joint Task Force-Information Operations (JTF-IO) is warranted to provide component level control, direction and authority to conduct IO throughout the joint task force. If activated in the earliest stages of crisis development, on advice of the combatant commander's IO group, the JTF-IO would have more time to create a comprehensive IO plan and component level authority to direct all IO organizations throughout the task force in the execution of this plan. This would significantly increase the time for the elements of IO to become effective and could lead to a prevention of armed conflict. If conflict were not avoided, the JTF-IO would become part of the JTF commander's staff and would continue to direct the IO campaign and provide a fully developed operational preparation of the battle space, enabling more rapid commencement of combat operations.

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Introduction

Joint doctrine provides the foundation for operations for today's armed forces, and more seems to be written daily to address the expansion and evolution of warfare in many areas. One of the aspects of warfare that has evolved significantly over time is information operations. Although the basic concepts of information operations are not new, technology and the increase of asymmetric warfare have allowed for an explosion in this area and the relatively inexpensive means by which virtually anybody can wage some level of information warfare. It is often stated that information is power, and, therefore implied that he who gains that power while denying it from a competitor will have the upper hand. Recent military events suggest that less potent military organizations can seize the initiative by successfully engaging in information operations, frustrating a military superior in both personnel and technology. This frustration can be simply embarrassing or very costly, expressed in terms of number of lives lost in conflict.

Subsequent paragraphs will capture the essence of information operations (IO), but only in the broadest of terms, in order to provide a basic knowledge of the warfare area. Recent operations will be analyzed with respect to IO to identify areas of deficiency or ambiguity. Initial research suggests that current doctrine does not adequately specify IO responsibilities or the IO command organization. Creation of a joint task force-information operations (JTF-IO) would address the documented deficiencies and improve the effectiveness of information operations. When activated, a JTF-IO would be the first large scale attempt to bring the elements of information operations to bear on a brewing crisis situation. In addition to focusing the elements of IO, the early activation of a JTF-IO, prior to the need for a full joint task force, would provide a significant benefit over current IO

organizations in that it would allow time for the actions associated with IO to take effect. Some of the elements of IO are designed to influence popular opinion, requiring substantial amounts of time. In some cases, early activation of a JTF-IO might defuse the situation, eliminating the need for a full JTF. If so, the benefits of a JTF-IO would be measured in terms of lives saved, so this concept clearly deserves extensive study.

Background

In order to determine whether a joint task force-information operations (JTF-IO) is required, it is necessary to understand the basics of information operations (IO) and the current IO organization according to joint doctrine. Information operations involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.¹ Stated another way, its goal is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the United States and its allies.² Currently under revision, the draft version of *Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, describes information operations as “the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversary human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”³

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), p I-1.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Second Draft)* (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 2004), p I-1. Document is currently in draft form with expected publication in near future.

³ Ibid.

A critical element of an information operations plan is a central theme or message, consistent throughout every level of the government or military organization. In an effort to ensure commonality of message, the IO organization of the United States has been modified recently. The Office of Global Communications was formed in 2002 to coordinate strategic communications that integrate the President's themes while truthfully projecting America and the administration's policies.⁴ These themes would be transmitted through the combatant commander to the commander of the JTF-IO, who would ensure the consistency of the message in all efforts. The issue of truthfulness is one that plays a critical role in effective information operations. For example, a psychological operations campaign must be based in truth in order to properly and completely influence the intended audience. If discovered, any conflict in the message could destroy any gains made in this influence, which could have catastrophic repercussions.

Each regional combatant commander is required to employ IO within his respective area of responsibility (AOR).⁵ The comprehensive regional strategy for IO and other issues is promulgated in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), a classified document written by the combatant commander to establish goals and priorities within the AOR. It is the link between the combatant commander and national strategic objectives, and needs to include planning for IO from its inception.⁶ In addition to the measures detailed in the TSCP, multi-national military exercises, port visits by U. S. Navy and Coast Guard ships, humanitarian missions, such as school building improvements, and medical clinics conducted

⁴ White House Office of Global Communications web page; available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ogc/aboutogc.html>; Internet; accessed 5 May 2005.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Second Draft)*, p IV-2.

⁶ Leigh Armistead, ed., *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*, (Washington, D.C., Brassey's, Inc., 2004), p 112.

by U.S. military personnel are examples of IO being conducted on a daily basis. A small group of IO personnel supports the combatant commander in the coordination of these efforts, but can be easily overwhelmed during a crisis situation when all elements of IO need to be focused on a specific area. Activation of a JTF-IO would alleviate this problem, providing for a component level focused approach on the crisis area while allowing the combatant commander's IO staff to continue to assess and plan for IO across the balance of the AOR.

Although not elements of information operations by the JP 3-13 definition, civil affairs (CA) and public affairs (PA) are closely related areas, complementary to the core competencies of IO. Each of these actions plays a role in IO, requiring close coordination in order to achieve the desired effect. In times of crisis, the JTF-IO would be far better suited to orchestrate these related activities than the combatant commander's IO staff, as the JTF-IO would have the resources and authority not always available to the combatant commander's IO staff. Early intervention is required to effectively influence popular opinion and "win hearts and minds" of a target audience and the activation of a JTF-IO at the first sign of potential crisis would increase the likelihood of preventing armed hostilities.

The responsibility of organizing the planning and execution of IO for the combatant commander is normally assigned to an IO officer, typically a member of the operations directorate. He is the combatant commander's primary point of contact in all IO related matters and leads a small group of subject matter experts from the combatant commander's staff.⁷ In peace time, these individuals monitor information operations across the commander's respective AOR. Under current doctrine, when a situation develops that

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Second Draft)*, p IV-4.

requires a joint task force (JTF), this officer may become the IO cell lead, and along with additional IO professionals from the joint force, would initiate crisis or deliberate planning for IO to support the JTF commander's goals. By the time the IO cell has formed, however, there may not be sufficient time to allow the effects of IO actions to be felt. At that point, the IO cell is merely assisting in the preparation of the battle space. The time for non-violent resolution of the conflict has likely passed.

Current doctrine states that the manning of the IO cell on the JTF commander's staff is adaptable to the situation, but could comprise more personnel than the combatant commander's IO staff.⁸ If additional personnel are required, various service and joint organizations throughout the United States, such as U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), Air Force Information Warfare Center (U.S. Air Force), Fleet Information Warfare Center (U.S. Navy), and Land Information Warfare Activity (U.S. Army), would also provide assistance, either in information or personnel augmentation.⁹

During the last five years, there has been a steadily increasing requirement for establishment of joint task forces, and all indications are that this trend will continue.¹⁰ One of the problems that each JTF faces is a limited time available to assemble, conduct planning and be prepared to execute operations to terminate the crisis situation. In an effort to address this, each combatant commander is required to form a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). This permanently manned and trained organization could form the core of a JTF staff and allow for accelerated operational readiness. The proposed SJFHQ manning

⁸ Ibid., p IV-10.

⁹ Ibid., p IV-11.

¹⁰ Richard O'Hanlon, U. S. Joint Forces Command, "Transformation and Responding to Today's Threat", presentation given at Naval War College, February 2005, p 28.

includes a small number of information operations personnel, but the complex nature of IO calls into question whether this small group can effectively coordinate IO at the operational level during a crisis. The lessons learned of the next conflict may answer that question.

Analysis

The need to improve our ability to effectively conduct information operations has resulted in inclusion of aspects of IO in existing exercises and creation of exercises specifically focused on IO. Millennium Challenge was an exercise in which IO was conducted to produce decisive effects. Recognizing that a joint task force commander and his staff are heavily reliant on both information and information systems, the 2002 exercise allowed interagency efforts to attack this vulnerability with a great deal of success. Several lessons learned from the exercise are relevant. Better IO defensive measures would be required in future exercises in order to allow friendly forces to operate effectively against a skilled adversary.¹¹ A clear, overarching national policy for IO was lacking, adding to confusion and ineffective IO.¹² Although personnel augmentation from external organizations was provided, it was determined that combatant commanders and joint task force commanders will need IO expertise resident on their staffs to effectively employ IO. Although each of the services provided personnel familiar in various aspects of IO, few had enough experience at the higher headquarters level to completely understand their role in the overall plan.¹³ During the exercise, IO achieved component-level status, but lacked the

¹¹ Mark W. Maiers and Timothy L. Rahn, “Information Operations and Millennium Challenge”, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 35, 2004: p 85.

¹² Ibid., p 84.

¹³ Ibid., p 86.

resources and authority to be effective.¹⁴ A single commander was determined to be required to better coordinate IO activities, and to ensure that IO would be the force multiplier necessary to more effectively conduct combat action.¹⁵ In short, the exercise joint task force commander recognized IO as a key element of combat power, one that needs to be more fully developed for future conflicts.¹⁶ A JTF-IO would have been able to provide the overarching philosophy, including a detailed plan addressing all aspects of IO with specific tasks and responsibilities to all IO components. The JTF-IO commander would be empowered to exercise component level authority and direct IO resources from all of its components.

During Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic used IO to his advantage by highlighting collateral damage incidents by NATO forces and displaying them in near real time on international television news services. These headlines diverted attention from the horrific actions of Serbian forces and significantly complicated NATO efforts to gain information superiority.

Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe and Commander, Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL during Operation ALLIED FORCE, stated that all the tools were in place for the friendly IO effort, but only a few were used, and that the personnel working on IO were too junior and from the wrong communities to have the proper effect.¹⁷ In order to prevent a future adversary from similarly taking advantage of the IO spectrum, clear doctrine must be provided, with specific guidance on IO organization, tasks, and areas of responsibility.

¹⁴ Ibid., p 87.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ J. O. Ellis, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, “A View from the Top”, After Action Report on Operation ALLIED FORCE, p 17.

Not all the examples from ALLIED FORCE were negative, however. When the massive bombing campaign alone did not seem to be achieving the desired results, a plan to discredit Milosevic himself was implemented, creating doubt about his policies and attacking his vulnerable economic resources. A combination of press conferences, press releases and precision bombing of key factories contributed to the downfall of Milosevic and the end of the conflict.¹⁸

Operation ALLIED FORCE provides the best example of a conflict that a JTF-IO may have successfully avoided. The crisis situation in the former Republic of Yugoslavia had been developing for years. The early activation of a JTF-IO in the months or years leading up to combat would have resulted in a comprehensive plan that addressed all facets of IO. For example, just as we have branches in our operational plans, a JTF-IO could have provided coordinated branch plans to deal with the accidental civilian casualties or destruction of non-military targets, denying Milosevic his PA ‘victories’. The years leading up to the start of the NATO air attacks could have seen a JTF-IO led effort to convince the local population that Milosevic was murdering innocent Albanians and may have resulted in an erosion of his support structure. Failing the prevention of hostilities, a JTF-IO would have created and executed the plan for a multi-national IO campaign that Admiral Ellis and others noted was incomplete or missing.¹⁹ Specific tasking would have been provided to each component and areas of responsibility would have been assigned and, if necessary, negotiated prior to armed conflict to ensure superior results. In the end, incomplete as the

¹⁸ Leigh Armistead, *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*, p 204.

¹⁹ J. O. Ellis, “A View from the Top”, p 24.

plan was, IO significantly contributed to the termination of conflict in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.²⁰

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provided many examples of information operations application, although areas of deficiency were noted. One example suggests that the improvements in IO at the strategic and operational levels of war have not migrated completely to the tactical level of war. Reports from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (24th MEU(SOC)) indicate that tactical level IO, although effective, focused only on psychological operations, civil-military operations (CMO) and public affairs (PA).²¹ A series of CMO projects, ranging from cleaning schoolhouses to building soccer fields, was well documented by the embedded media reporters and transmitted around the world.²² The positive media image helped to convince the Iraqi people that the coalition forces were genuine in their efforts to help rebuild the nation and undoubtedly eased that process. Activation of a JTF-IO would improve the translation of IO objectives from the strategic to tactical levels of war in the following ways. The JTF-IO would identify the IO centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities and create an operational level IO plan that would encompass strategic objectives with respect to IO. The JTF-IO would then ensure tactical level IO events broadcast the same message, targeted the proper audience, and were synchronized with strategic and operational IO objectives.

A recent example of a situation that could benefit from a JTF-IO is the crisis in Haiti. Despite the removal of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from the country in early 2004, the nation remains in turmoil, with armed gangs, drug traffickers and paramilitary security forces

²⁰ Leigh Armistead, *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*, p 204.

²¹ Joseph F. Paschall, “Tactical Information Operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM”, *Marine Corps Gazette*, volume 88, issue 3, March 2004: p 56.

²² Ibid., p 58.

in control.²³ With dedicated international support and forces capable of restoring security, a JTF-IO could influence the local population to support pro-democracy factions in the restoration of ‘normalcy’ in the country. Over time, this would reduce the conflict within the nation and greatly reduce the chance of U.S. military intervention in the future. In a country with recurring internal conflict, there may be some benefit in a standing JTF-IO to maintain a highly concentrated IO focus, using the operational factor of time to our advantage.

Recommendations

When it comes to information operations, one thing is certain. As a whole, the United States is improving in its ability to effectively practice IO, both in terms of training and practical, real world application. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM demonstrated a much better cohesion, not only of the military, but the many other government agencies, as well as the non-government organizations, than just ten years earlier during Operation DESERT STORM.²⁴ Military leaders recognize the power of information operations, and see it, when effectively employed, as a force multiplier. In a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Tommy Franks, Commander of U. S. Central Command during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, specifically addressed the importance of IO. He stated “to maintain information dominance, we must commit to improving our ability to influence target audiences and manipulate our adversary’s information environment. Continued development of these capabilities is essential.”²⁵ On the subject of IO in Afghanistan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B.

²³ Washington Post (Washington, D. C.), 5 April 2005.

²⁴ Leigh Armistead, *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*, p 141.

²⁵ General Tommy Franks, “Statement before the Senate Armed Service Committee” U.S. Senate update (7 February 2002), quoted in Leigh Armistead, ed, *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power* (Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), p 159.

Myers stated “it took too much time to put together the team. We missed the opportunity to send the right message, sometimes we sent mixed signals, and we missed opportunities as well.”²⁶ In his after action report, Admiral James O. Ellis said of IO during Operation ALLIED FORCE “at once a great success … and perhaps the greatest failure of the war.”²⁷

With all its advances, IO has room for improvement. One area that needs to be resolved is doctrine, specifically IO functional areas of responsibility and command organization. Since the expertise in the core competencies resides in personnel of the individual services, joint doctrine and service doctrine with respect to IO must be aligned. Although the basic functions of IO have existed for centuries, its doctrine is relatively new and, in some cases, the differences from service to joint doctrine create seams that will decrease the effectiveness of an IO plan.²⁸ As IO is an area of warfare unique to no single service, a paradigm shift is required of all the services to ensure that this becomes a truly joint warfare area.

Another recommended change to doctrine would be the inclusion of civil affairs (CA) and public affairs (PA) as core functions of IO. Although at the tactical level, the example of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (24th MEU(SOC)) during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated the complementary nature of CA and PA with the core elements of IO.²⁹ At the operational level, a JTF-IO would be better staffed and equipped to orchestrate CA, PA and the elements of IO across an entire joint operational

²⁶ Jim Garamone, “General Myers speaks about the Importance of Focused National Power”, Armed Forces News Service (16 November 2001), quoted in Leigh Armistead, ed, *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power* (Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), p 160.

²⁷ J. O. Ellis, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, “A View from the Top”, p 17.

²⁸ Karlton D. Johnson, “Rethinking Joint Information Operations”, *Signal*, Volume 57, Issue 2 Oct 2002, p 58.

²⁹ Joseph F. Paschall, “Tactical Information Operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM”: p 57.

area, from initiation of planning through termination of combat operations and the transition to peace, and would therefore improve the effectiveness of an IO campaign.

The area with the most potential benefit to information operations is in doctrine with respect to command or coordination organization. As described previously, current doctrine provides the combatant commander with an IO officer and a small staff to coordinate IO within his AOR. When a crisis situation develops, the combatant commander will stand up a joint task force and IO planning and coordination for the task force will be accomplished by a small group of IO professionals, perhaps with augmentation from various service and interagency centers of excellence. Of note, many joint task forces have less than ninety days, and some less than thirty days, from activation to the start of armed conflict.³⁰ The operational factor of time is a critical aspect of information operations. The more time provided for IO to impact the adversary's decision-making process, the more likely the results would benefit friendly forces. These facts suggest that a more permanent organization focused solely on IO would be effective at reducing the duration of armed conflict and quite possibly preventing it from occurring. Although each of the combatant commanders will soon have a standing joint forces headquarters (SJFHQ), the small number of IO personnel assigned severely limits the scope of IO that can be coordinated without augmentation. By the time a SJFHQ is activated by the combatant commander, there will be insufficient time for IO efforts to be completely effective.

The creation of a joint task force-information operations (JTF-IO) is the solution to many of the deficiencies noted. Led by an O-6 [Colonel in the USMC, USA, or USAF, or Captain in the USN] from any service and comprised of a team of dedicated experts in each of the core functions, with the addition of public affairs, civil affairs, and interagency

³⁰ Richard O'Hanlon, U. S. Joint Forces Command, "Transformation and Responding to Today's Threat", p 31.

representatives, this group's sole function would be the focused employment of IO in a specific location in a combatant commander's geographic area of responsibility. A JTF-IO would be designated by a combatant commander for a specific crisis situation, just as a JTF is designated under current doctrine. The JTF-IO would be an intermediate step in the preparation for combat, and if successful, would prevent the need for the next step.

When indications of impending crisis were received by the combatant commander's IO organization, the staff IO officer would recommend JTF-IO activation to the commander. The JTF-IO would take all available information from the IO cell, allowing the cell to monitor the balance of the AOR. The JTF-IO would then initiate planning, determining the adversary's IO centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities in a rapid manner. If required, small teams of IO field specialists could be deployed to the troubled area. By arriving on scene early, and with PA and CA personnel integrated into the teams, a potential crisis situation could be defused before escalation. The application of the tools of soft power could prevent the loss of life in many scenarios. If the focused efforts of the JTF-IO were unsuccessful at preventing armed conflict, the commander of a full joint task force would find the intelligence and operational preparation of the battle space well documented and more rapid commencement of crisis planning and combat action would be possible. In this case, the JTF-IO would be absorbed into the JTF core staff and would provide the JTF commander with all required IO support. Additionally, allowing the JTF-IO to become part of the JTF commander's staff would enable effective coordination between IO and conventional operations. If deployed in earlier phases, the IO field teams could provide the JTF commander with real time intelligence and a true sense of the impact of combat on the local population. This knowledge could be utilized in conjunction with other instruments of

national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) to influence an adversary's decision-making process and bring combat action to a more rapid termination.

Current doctrine provides for an IO group on the combatant commander's staff, but its responsibilities span the entire AOR. The combatant commander's IO group could focus on a specific country, but at the expense of the rest of the AOR. Additionally, the leader of this group may not be empowered to direct service components in the efficient employment of IO forces. A more senior and doctrinally supported JTF-IO would be capable of doing just that.

The JTF-IO would also resolve many of the deficiencies documented in recent operational conflicts and exercises. One of the reasons for difficulties with IO during the war in Kosovo was the lack of a concerted peacetime IO campaign, despite the fact that there was time to create such a plan.³¹ A JTF-IO activated by the Commander, U. S. European Command well before Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999 could have created a comprehensive plan and set it in motion to influence future events. During exercise Millennium Challenge in 2002, the JTF commander acknowledged the importance of IO, but the exercise demonstrated that under current doctrine, the command structure did not provide sufficient resources or authority to be genuinely effective.³² A JTF-IO would address this weakness. Another benefit of the JTF-IO would be in the size of the staff itself. This staff would be larger than the combatant commander's IO group, which would facilitate coordination with allies and would better enable the inclusion of coalition partners in the execution of IO.

³¹ Zachary P. Hubbard, "Information Operations and Information Warfare in Kosovo: A Report Card We Didn't Want to Bring Home", *Cyber Sword*, Spring 2000, volume 4, number I, p 27.

³² Mark W. Maiers and Timothy L. Rahn, "Information Operations and Millennium Challenge", p 87.

Regardless of the doctrinal structure of an information operations organization, there are several key points to stress. In order to ensure that the theme of all information operations is consistent, the Office of Global Communications in the White House must make that theme available at every level of warfare. All participants at every level, including ambassadors, country team members, and other members of the diplomatic community, as well as coalition partners if applicable, must operate with the same basic message, critical to an IO campaign's success. It is especially important that IO planners utilize this message and that officials throughout the chain of command understand it in order to prevent embarrassment to U. S. government officials or, even worse, ineffective IO that allows armed conflict to last for even one day longer than required, risking more lives. A JTF-IO would ensure that the message was consistent at every level of planning and execution.

Information operations personnel are members of the individual services and must continue to be trained by those services. Service bias and "old ways of doing business" must give way to a truly joint approach to this warfare area. Due to the tremendous increases in technology, especially computer networks and communications systems, what used to take days now takes milliseconds, significantly impacting this warfare area with respect to the operational factors of time and space. Joint information professionals of the future must recognize this and be prepared for the next technological advance and the impact it will have on warfare.

If the concept of a JTF specifically designed to plan and coordinate information operations is not adopted, lessons from recent conflicts and exercises must be truly learned, not simply observed. The SJFHQ is a structure that lends itself to many of the benefits of the proposed JTF-IO. Given the requirement for time to allow IO to be most effective, an

increase in IO personnel assigned to the SJFHQ would allow more thorough planning and a rapid initiation of IO, even as the SJFHQ itself is transitioning to full JTF status. The permanent nature of the SJFHQ would also allow interagency relationships to be better developed, significantly easing that process. It would also enable an improved working relationship with coalition partners with respect to IO, providing time to resolve the issue of sharing IO information and other IO coordination issues unique to coalition actions.

Conclusion

The world of information operations is becoming more complicated and more crowded on a daily basis. In order to tackle the challenges that technological advances and new, unfamiliar adversaries bring to test our resolve, paradigms must be broken and significant changes to the way we conduct this warfare area must be seriously considered. The addition of a Joint Task Force-Information Operations (JTF-IO) to joint doctrine would provide a command structure more capable of meeting these challenges than any structure delineated in today's doctrine, both in the exercise arena and on the battlefield. Admiral James O. Ellis stated that a properly executed IO effort could have halved the duration of the campaign in the war in Kosovo.³³ For this very reason, this is a warfare area that we cannot afford to ignore. All efforts to improve its effectiveness must be explored, starting with the creation of a Joint Task Force-Information Operations (JTF-IO).

³³ J. O. Ellis, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, "A View from the Top", p 17.

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